Summary: Sub-national governments in Indonesia have accumulated significant cash reserves since decentralization. During the period 2001-2006, sub-national reserves grew at an extraordinary rate-45 percent per annum. The current level of sub-national cash balances has reached approximately 3 percent of GDP. The geographic distribution of the stock of reserves is heavily skewed toward regions with abundant natural resources. Estimation of provincial-level panel data suggests that, at the margin, subnational governments save 74 percent of shared revenues and 52 percent of general allocation funds (DAU). The elasticity of the sub-national surplus with respect to shared revenues and the DAU is 1.18 and 4.36, respectively. In addition, the analysis shows that growth in regional minimum wages and increasing urbanization both exert significant downward pressure on the sub-national government surplus. Further insight into the determinants of sub-national surpluses and reserves would require specifically tailored field research. Such research is now being organized for implementation in early 2008.
Introduction
The Indonesian government has devolved significant expenditure authority to sub-national units since 2001. New sub-national government expenditure assignments have been paid for by a substantial increase in intergovernmental transfers to lower levels of government. The center has decided against devolving any significant new tax authority to the regions, at least for the time being.
As is now well known, the specific responsibilities of sub-nationals were not well defined in Law 22/99 and attendant regulations. Prior to the implementation of decentralization, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) did not attempt to rigorously estimate the amount of funds that would be required by sub-nationals in order to implement their intended new functions. Indeed, this was not really possible given the aforementioned lack of precision regarding defined expenditure assignments. MoF simply endeavored to assure that the level of transfers would exceed by some reasonable amount that which obtained under the pre-decentralization regime. New transfer mechanisms were then designed and codified in Law 25/99 in order to distribute the funds. This rather casual approach to expenditure and revenue assignments was not much changed in developments that culminated in the issuance of Laws 32/04 and 33/04.
This raises an obvious question (among many, perhaps): do sub-national governments have enough funds to adequately discharge their assigned duties? Sub-national government officials, as might be expected, often claim that their resources are insufficient to deliver public services for which they have become responsible. The central government questions this claim, indicating that sub-nationals have not even managed to spend the resources that have already been made available to them. As evidence, central officials point to the rather large and growing unspent balances at the sub-national level.
This note examines some fundamental issues related to these unspent funds. The paper has two particular objectives. First, the paper describes the basic features of sub-national government surplus and reserves since decentralization, including their size and spatial distribution. Second, it seeks to explain the observed variation in surplus across sub-national governments, according to some standard hypotheses.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, some basic information regarding the buildup and geographic distribution of sub-national reserves is offered. Second, the methodological approach to the study of sub-national government surpluses is detailed. Third, the results of the econometric examination are presented and discussed. Finally, the note closes with a summary of the main findings and a proposal for some additional research that might be useful in the continuing development of central policy in this area.
Background
This paper uses sub-national government bank deposits to indicate reserve funds. Sub-national governments are not (yet) known to invest in central government certificates of deposit (SBI), treasuries, or other similar financial instruments to store their funds. The banks in which subnationals hold their reserves do, however, invest significantly in such instruments. In any case, the use of deposits as a proxy for sub-national reserves seems reasonable under the present circumstances.
Sub-national government surplus (deficit) is defined as the increase (decrease) in reserve funds from one year to the next. Sub-national governments have not borrowed since decentralization to finance the development of infrastructure. Instead, they use own-source revenues and transfers for public capital expenditure. As a result, the surplus/deficit, as defined here, is net of capital spending.
The data used in this analysis come from Bank Indonesia (BI). BI has information on all subnational government (demand, savings, and time) deposits in commercial banks in the country. The sub-national government deposit data employed in this investigation have been aggregated at the provincial level. So, for each province in the country, deposit data are those for the provincial government and all kabupaten/kota within the province. The individual government level data have not been made available due to confidentiality concerns. 
Rupiah (Blns)
Presently, districts (i.e. kabupaten/kota) hold about 70 percent of the total stock of reserves. The rest of the funds are in the possession of provincial governments. Sub-national government enterprises (e.g. local water enterprises-PDAM) have negligible reserves. Sub-national reserves are distributed very unevenly geographically. The vast bulk of reserve funds are owned by regional governments that are rich in natural resources. Sub-national governments in four natural resource rich provinces-Kalimantan Timur, Riau, Aceh, and Papua-hold just less that 45 percent of the total stock of reserves. This growth was driven in large measure by the significant rise in the oil price during those two years (which forces an increase in shared oil revenues with sub-nationals).
Second, note the substantial increase in block grants in 2006. This is also a function of the rising price of oil, as well as the fact that government adopted a reasonable estimate of that price in the state budget for the first time in many years. All other things being equal, a higher budgeted price of oil drives up planned domestic revenues, which serve as the basis for determining the pool of finance for block grants; previously, the government purposefully underestimated the price of oil in the national budget in order to reduce its transfer obligations to the regions.
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In any case, the considerable increase in revenue sharing and block grants in 2005 and 2006 corresponds closely with the significant rise in sub-national surplus during those two years, as shown in Figure 1 . This suggests at least one possible factor that determines the annual subnational surplus and the accumulation of reserves-increases in intergovernmental transfers. This is considered in more detail below. 
Methodological Approach
The approach used in this paper to analyze sub-national surpluses and reserves dates back to the pioneering work of Gramlich and Galper (1973) and Gramlich (1991) . In broad terms, the method developed by those authors posits that the surplus is a positive function of fiscal transfers to sub-national units and a negative function of sub-national expenditure needs. In this scheme, surplus is but one part of a larger fiscal system comprising sub-national expenditures and taxes, as well, both of which are also a function of transfers and spending needs. Lewis (2005) employed the general Gramlich-Galper framework to study Indonesian local government spending, taxing, and savings just before and after decentralization. The present paper focuses on explaining the Indonesian sub-national surplus since the implementation of decentralization began in 2001 through 2006. Simple (one-way) fixed effects models are used to operationalize the methods described above. 3 More particularly, to start it is assumed that:
where y is sub-national government surplus, x is a vector of explanatory variables, and are parameters to be estimated, is the usual error term (with mean and variance equal to zero and 2 , respectively), and subscripts i and t refer to the province in which sub-national governments are located and the year, respectively.
Explanatory variables comprise tax and non-tax shared revenues, general allocation funds (DAU), the minimum wage, and the percent of the population that is urban. 4 All variables are province-specific. The surplus, shared revenues, and general allocation funds are summed across the provincial government and all local governments within the province. It is expected that subnational surplus varies positively with transfers and negatively with the minimum wage and urbanization, all other things remaining equal.
One possible problem with the specification above concerns the assumed exogenous nature of general allocation funds. This (equalization) grant is determined by the Ministry of Finance as a function the difference between sub-national government fiscal needs and (expected) revenues from other sources. The distribution formula uses population, area, poverty, and a cost index as proxies for fiscal needs; other revenues include those from shared tax and non-tax revenues and own-source revenues, where the latter is estimated as a function of gross regional domestic product (GRDP). As such, it might be more reasonable to assume that the general allocation fund is endogenous. It is therefore posited that:
where x 1 comprises variables representing shared tax and non-tax revenues, minimum wage, and urbanization; and x 2 denotes general allocation funds, which are now assumed to be endogenous (and therefore possibly correlated with ). All other variables are as previously defined.
Estimation of equation (2) requires a set of instruments to represent the general allocation fund, x 2 . Instruments employed in the estimation include population, poverty head count, the provincial consumer price index (CPI) 5 , GRDP, and all variables in x 1 . 6 The variables used in the empirical analysis are named and defined in 
Empirical Results
Equation (1) is consistently and efficiently estimated using least squares with one-way fixed effects. Equation (2) is estimated via two stage least squares procedures. The latter provides consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters in the one-way fixed effects model. Greene (2007) discusses the methodological details. Table 3 shows the estimation results for both models. The table provides the estimated coefficients, t statistics, and an indication of significance of the estimated coefficients. The number of observations, the values of the log likelihood and restricted log likelihood functions, and the adjusted R 2 appear at the bottom of the table. The least squares estimation results for equation (1) are provided for comparison purposes only. Discussion focuses on the output from the two-stage least squares estimation of equation (2). 18, 4.36, -12.89, and -19.92, respectively. Thus, more of each additional rupiah transferred through shared revenues is saved than is the case for the DAU. But because the DAU is larger relative to savings than shared revenues are, a percentage increase in the former leads to larger surpluses than an equivalent percentage increase in the latter. A rise in the minimum wage drives up the costs of sub-national governments (because of resultant upward pressure on the government wage bill and because of higher costs associated with contracting out the development of infrastructure projects and/or or service delivery) and leads to diminished surpluses. Urbanization results in increased expenditure needs (i.e. a larger package of public services for urban residents), which, all other things begin equal, similarly reduces the sub-national surplus. Presently, districts (i.e. kabupaten/kota) hold about 70 percent of the total stock of reserves. The rest of the funds are in the possession of provincial governments. The geographic distribution of the stock of reserves is heavily skewed toward regions with abundant natural resources. Subnational governments in Kalimantan Timur, Riau, Aceh, and Papua provinces hold just less than 45 percent of the total stock of reserves.
Two stage least squares estimation of provincial-level panel data suggests that an increase of one rupiah of per capita revenue sharing leads to 0.74 rupiah increase in per capita surplus while a one rupiah increase in per capita general allocation funds (DAU) leads to a rise in per capita savings of 0.52 rupiah. The elasticity of the sub-national surplus with respect to shared revenues and the DAU is 1.18 and 4.36, respectively. In addition, the analysis shows that growth in regional minimum wages and increasing urbanization both exert significant downward pressure on sub-national government surplus and, therefore, reserves.
In the context of the policy discussion on these issues, many other reasons have been offered to explain the large increase in sub-national government reserves. Other possible explanations include those concerning the late approval of sub-national budgets by higher level authorities, which delays development spending well into the fiscal year; significant and increasing central government expenditure on decentralized tasks, which crowds out sub-national public spending; sub-national government officials' fear of corruption, which constraints spending; and lack of regional capacity to organize and implement development projects in a timely manner.
The investigation of these possible causes of the buildup of sub-national reserves is not amenable to the kind of formal empirical analysis conducted in this paper. Further insight into other possible determinants of sub-national surpluses would require some specifically tailored field research. Such research is now being organized and will begin implementation starting in early 2008.
